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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs/ Appellants in this matter, Doug and Amy Crump (hereafter "Crump"), appeal 
both the Magistrate and District Courts' exercise of discretion, in determining the Defendant Ted 
Bromley dba Rhino Lining ( hereafter "Bromley") to be the prevailing paiiy in the lawsuit at issue. 
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
A) Did both the Magistrate Court and District Court abuse their discretion in holding 
Bromley to be the prevailing party in the lawsuit at issue? 
B) Did both the Magistrate Court and District Court abuse their discretion in considering 
Bromley'sofferofjudgment as a factor in reaching its determination of which party prevailed under 
I.R.C.P. 54( e)(3)? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The determination of a prevailing party, is a matter of discretion and the Idaho Supreme 
Court reviews an appeal of this determination under an abuse of discretion standard. Eighteen Mile 
Ranch v. Nord Excavation & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19, 117 P.3d 130, 132-33 (2005). 
Unless the Court deems that the lower court abused its discretion, the prevailing paiiy determination 
will not be overturned. Bybee v. Isaac,_ Idaho_, 178 P .3d 616, 625 (2008). 
IV. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Suit in this matter was filed on November 2, 2005, by Doug and Amy Crump ("Crump"). 
In their Complaint, Crump alleged damages in the amount of $2,820.00 for damage to a boat, and 
value forloss of use of said boat. On December 14, 2005, Bromley, through counsel, offered Crump 
$1,000.00 to settle this matter in full. (See Exhibit "3"Affidavit of.Justin Oleson filed on April 27, 
2007). Bromley stated that this offer of settlement was essentially a "nuisance" offer, as he believed 
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the claim to be defendable, but realized it would cost more money to defend than the claim itself was 
worth. Id. Crump refused the settlement offer, resulting in Bromley filing both an answer and 
counterclaim, as Crump had never paid for the work done on the boat. (Vol. I, p. 31, Defendant's 
Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint and Counterclaim,. Bromley requested damages in the amount of 
$400.00, for the unpaid work. Id. On the same day the Answer was filed, Bromley also filed an 
Offer of Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 68 in the amount of$1,000.00. 
The matter finally came to a head with both parties filing Motions for Summary Judgment. 
A hearing was held on November 21, 2006, with the Court denying each party's motion. However, 
the Court did rule that it would cost $600.00 to fix the damage to the Crump's boat, but made no 
finding as to whether Bromley was responsible for said damage. 
After the Court's findings on the Motions for Summary Judgment, the parties entered into 
a stipulation, where Bromley agreed to the entry of a judgment in the amount of$200.00. (Vol. II, 
p. 131, Stipulation for Judgment). This represented the $600.00 repair value placed upon the boat 
by the Court, minus the $400.00 owed Bromley for the work done. The issue of attorney fees was 
reserved for further proceedings. 
Both parties then moved for attorney fees and costs, claiming to be the prevailing party. 
Hearing on the cross motions was held on June 7, 2007. The Court, exercising its discretion, entered 
an Order finding Bromley to be the prevailing party pursuant to 54(d)(l)(B). (Vol. II, p. 159, 
Memorandum Decision on Cross Motions for Attorneys Fees and Costs and Order ). After 
considering the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54( e )(3), and also the fact that Crump recovered less than 
Bromley's offer of judgment, the Court awarded Bromley $2,883.38 in fees and costs. Id. 
Crump then filed a Motion to Reconsider. The Court, once again, found Bromley to be the 
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prevailing party, but reduced the total award of fees and costs to $1,200.00. (Vol. II, p. 176, 
Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration Regarding Attorney's Fees and 
Costs). Crump then again appealed that decision to the District Court, regurgitating the same 
arguments as before. The District Court held that the Magistrate Court had correctly ruled Bromley 
to be a prevailing party as Crump had failed in defense ofBromley's counterclaim and Bromley had 
failed in part and prevailed in part in his defense of the Complaint. (Vol. II, p. 229). 
Crump has now, for the third time, asked a Court to revisit the prevailing party determination, 
even though they recovered a fraction of the damages that they plead, and Bromley fully recovered 
on his counterclaim. Plaintiff is essentially arguing that as long as they recover a single dollar, they 
should be deemed a prevailing party,.and be entitled to recover their attorney fees and costs. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court appropriately exercised its discretion in finding Bromley to be the 
prevailing party pursuant to Idaho law. 
Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may detennine that a party to an action 
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the 
costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable ma1111er after considering 
all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or 
judgments obtained. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) "The prevailing party question is exan1ined and detennined from an overall 
view, not a ciaim-by-ciaim analysis." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 719. The 
determination whether a party is a prevailing party is committed to the discretion of the trial comt 
and we review that determination for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 718-19. Abuse of discretion is 
determined by a three (3) part inquiry: 
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1. Did the Court correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion? 
2. Did the Court act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available? 
3. Did the Court reach its decision through an exercise of reason? 
Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 76, 156 P.3d 573 (2007). 
Crump attempts to argue that they, rather than Bromley, were the prevailing party in the prior 
litigation. Essentially, Crump's argument is that they received a judgment of$200.00 and therefore, 
they not only "prevailed" on their lawsuit, but also successfully defended against Bromley's 
counterclaim. Clearly this argument fails to consider both the law and the facts at hand. 
The Courtrecognized and applied the prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) 
in its original Order regarding attorney fees. (Vol. II, p. 159, Memorandum Decision on Cross 
Motions for Attorney Fees and Costs and Order). In the Court's Decision on Reconsideration, the 
Court further clarified that it was looking at the case from an "overall view," rather than a claim-by-
claim view. (Vol. II, p. 176). This was after recognizing that the detem1ination of a prevailing party 
was an issue submitted to the Court's discretion. Id. at 177. 
It is apparent when the three (3) part test for deten11ining abuse of discretion is applied, that 
the lower courts both properly analyzed and determined the prevailing party issue. First, each court 
recognized the issue as one of discretion, and then held that due to the large discrepancy in the 
amount plead for and the amount recovered by Crump, the factors of 54( e )(3), and the fact the 
Crump recovered less than the offer of judgment, and viewing the case from an "overall 
prospective", Bromley was the prevailing party under the definition found at I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). 
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A detem1ination clearly within the outer realms of each courts' discretion. Finally, each decision 
walked the parties through the basis for its decision, clearly indicating an exercise of reason. The 
courts both met all of the requirements in exercising its discretion, showing no abuse of said 
discretion, and requiring that the lower decisions be upheld. 
B. Crump did not successfully defend Bromley's claim, as Bromley fitlly recovered the 
$400. 00 in damages for which he plead. 
Crump claim they should be the prevailing party as "they successfully avoided all liability .... " 
(Page 6 Appellant's Brief). This is an obvious and intentional misstatement of the facts of the case. 
After the cross motions for summary judgment, the Court held the cost to repair the boat at 
issue was $600.00. A fact which Crump has admitted. (Vol. II, p. 207, footnote 27 Appellant's 
Brief District Court). After this determination by the Court, which did not address liability, the 
parties entered a stipulated judgment of$200.00. Again, by Crump's own admission, this amount 
constitutes the difference between the $600.00 amount to repair the boat, and the $400.00 plead in 
Bromley's Counterclaim. Id. Crump actually staies that they were "Giving Bromley full credit of 
$400.00 for his claim .... " Id. It is disingenuous for Crump to argue that they successfully defended 
Bromley's claim when he was given "full credit" for the amount sought in his Counterclaim. This 
argument defies common sense, as Bromley recovered the entire amount of damages he requested. 
This argument is further without merit, as it contravenes the facts of the case. Accordingly, the prior 
decisions from the lower courts must stand. 
C. Pursuant to IR. C.P. 54(e)(3}, the Court clearly has the ability to consider Bromley's 
Offer of Judgment in its determination of both prevailing party and amount of 
attorney fees to be awarded. 
Crump also argues that the lower courts somehow abused their discretion by discussing 
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Bromley's Offer of Judgment in reaching their prevailing party determination. Under I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3), in making a determination of the amount of attorney fees the court will award, a comi is 
required to consider several factors. The Court may also consider "Any other factor which the court 
deems appropriate in the particular case." Id. at (1). The court is not required to consider any 
particular factors in determining the prevailing party, but must look the case as a whole. See supra 
Eighteen Mile Ranch at 719. Further, the Idal10 Supreme Court has held that an offer of judgment 
is one factor which the court may consider in reaching a prevailing party determination. Polk. v. 
Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 313, 17 P.3d 247 (2000). So clearly the impact of an offer of judgment, 
and the subsequent amount of recovery, is a factor which the court is free to consider in making a 
prevailing party detern1ination. Any argument to the contrary would contradict both the requirement 
of viewing the case as a whole, prior case law, and the factors which a court can consider in 
determining an award of attorney fees. Crumps argument is not supporied by Idaho law, and clearly 
cannot support a conclusion that the Court's determination on this matter be overturned. 
D. The lower court properly applied 1.R. C.P. 68 by rejitsing to consider the "adjusted 
award" argument set forth by Crump. 
On both the prior and present appeal, Crump claims error as the Court refused to consider 
the judgment amount, plus the attorney fees and costs accrued up to the point Bromley made his 
offer of judgment. (Page 12 Appellant's Brie/). However, as the District Court pointed out, this 
argument ignores prior case law. 
The district court held and we agree, that the Rule 68(b) reference to the inclusion of 
"any attorney fees under Rule 54(e)(l) incurred before service of the offer of 
judgment" in computing the adjusted award applies only if attorney fees have been 
granted. The ve1y term "adjusted award" implies that it includes only sums that have 
actually been awarded .... 
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Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 32 P.3d 695 (Ct. App. 2001). 
The holding in Payne clearly contradicts the claim set forth by Bromley that the "adjusted 
, . award" under LR.C.P. 68 was improperly calculated. As is clear from this case, an adjusted award 
only comes into play when attorney fees are awarded. Bromley did not recover on their claim for 
attorney fees and therefore cam1ot claim entitlement to an adjusted award. Accordingly, the decision 
of the lower courts must be upheld. 
VI. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
"Any party seeking attorney fees must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal 
in the first appellate brief filed by such party." I.A.R. 4l(a). A party who was previously deemed 
to be a prevailing party at the trial court level, is entitled to additional attorney fees if this 
determination is upheld on appeal. Eighteen Mile Ranch at 721. On appeal, the mandatory fee 
· provisions of LC. § 12-120 govern as well. Daisy Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. PaintbaU Sports, 
Jnc.,134 Idaho 259,263, 999 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 2000). Under LC. § 12-121, a prevailing party may 
recover attorney fees at the Courts discretion. This section is limited by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) which 
allows for recovery of attorney fees to a prevailing party, but only under I. C. § 12-121 when the court 
finds that "the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." The same reasoning applies to an appeal which was brought frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation. Sinclair & Co. v. Gurule, 114 Idaho 362, 757 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Further, a party who prevails on appeal is entitled to his costs, pursuant to LC.§ 12-107 and I.R.C.P 
54(d)(l). 
As the Court is well aware, Bromley was deemed by both the magistrate and district Comis 
to be the prevailing party in this action. Both judges properly exercised their discretion and 
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reasoning in reaching a detennination that complies with the controlling case law and rules. As such, 
Bromley is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
Further, Crump has now appealed for the second time, after bringing a motion to reconsider, 
a claim for attorney fees on an overall judgment of $200.00. The additional fees and costs which 
both parties have accrued due to the multiple appeals by Crump cannot be justified and are 
unreasonable. The continuous appeals and increasing of fees, is both unreasonable and frivolous, 
wananting an award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-121 as well. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Bromley recovered the full amount ofhis counterclaim and was only liable for approximately 
seven percent (7%) of the amount Crump sought in their Complaint. Both the Magistrate and 
District Court applied their discretion in deeming Crump the prevailing party. Both decisions were 
based in reason, utilizing the factors and case law available. Any argument that either court acted 
outside the boundaries of its discretion or failed to exercise reason is without merit. Accordingly, 
the prior decision must be affirn1ed. 
DATED AND SIGNED this J[ day of March, 2009. 
BLASE~-· )SEN & OLESON, Chrt. 
By: ~~-~-----
)OSTIN B. OLESON 
/ Attorneys for Defendant 
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